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Abstract Recent case law on sexual violence crimes heard before the ad hoc
international criminal tribunals and courts, that interpret them in connection with
ethnic conflict, raises the question of which acts can be defined as sexual violence.
The International Criminal Court (ICC), in the situation of Kenya, does not regard
acts of forced nudity, forcible circumcision and penile amputation as sexual vio-
lence when they are motivated by ethnic prejudice and intended to demonstrate the
cultural superiority of one tribe over another. The Court argues that not every act of
violence that targets parts of the body commonly associated with sexuality should
be considered an act of sexual violence. This recent interpretation of what counts as
sexual violence provides another example of the complicity of international crim-
inal law institutions in the ongoing construction process of female subordination.
The ICC, in the Kenya situation, implicitly confirms the mutilation of female
agency by interpreting penile amputation as a kind of power game between males,
and by instrumentalizing the male sexual organ as an indicator of masculinity and
manhood.
Keywords Sexual violence  International Criminal Court  Intersectionality 
Kenya case  Masculinity
Introduction
Similar to the gendered aspect of regulatory ideals or norms that penetrate into the
acts and bodies of women and men with a heterosexual imperative (Butler 1993,
1997) is the gendered aspect of the notion of the ‘‘sexual’’ in sexual violence crimes
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(Campbell 2007, 417). By considering how the law, which is predominantly male-
oriented, silences feminist discourses in favour of masculine voices (Collier 1995,
1998; Irigaray 1985, 2013; Smart 1989, 2013), this article questions how far the
International Criminal Court (ICC or ‘‘the Court’’) has moved from such masculinist
discourse in its jurisprudence regarding sexual violence crimes in the particular case
of the Prosecutor v. Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta et al.1
This study attempts to engage with the puzzle of how the Court evaluates sexual
violence crimes other than rape as crimes against humanity in the Kenyan context.
The ICC, in its decision to confirm the charges against three suspects in the Kenya
situation, takes a noteworthy step by concluding that forced nudity, forcible
circumcision, and penile amputation do not correspond to sexual violence given the
specific circumstances of the events.2 The ICC is of the view that ‘‘not every act of
violence which targets parts of the body commonly associated with sexuality should
be considered an act of sexual violence.’’3 More specifically, ‘‘[t]he acts were
motivated by ethnic prejudice and intended to demonstrate cultural superiority of
one tribe over the other,’’ so they do not qualify as other forms of sexual violence
within the meaning of Article 7 (1) (g) of the Rome Statute.4
Despite the common perspective that the particularity of the sexual violence
crimes lies in their power dimension, manifested explicitly or implicitly regardless
of the victims’ sex (Sivakumaran 2007, 267–270), there is a significant difference in
how the effects of such violence on male and female victims are interpreted. It is
striking that common discourse surrounding male victims of sexual violence
concerns damage to masculinity or loss of manhood (Christian et al. 2011, 235–236;
Groth and Birnbaum 1979, 2; Sivakumaran 2007, 270–273), while female victims
are not thought to have lost their femininity. The emphasis on masculinity and
manhood is also made public in UN documents:
Men and adolescent boys are also subject to gender-based and sexual torture.
The sexual abuse, torture and mutilation of male detainees or prisoners is often
carried out to attack and destroy their sense of masculinity or manhood. […]
1 Kenya, a state party to the Rome Statute since 2005, is one of the eight situations the ICC is currently
investigating with three ongoing trials. The case against Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta, President of the
Republic of Kenya, has caused significant tension between the ICC and the African Union (AU) due to its
being the first trial of a sitting Head of State before the Court. Kenyatta was allegedly criminally
responsible as an indirect co-perpetrator pursuant to article 25(3)(a) of the Rome Statute for the crimes
against humanity of murder (article 7(l)(a)), deportation or forcible transfer (article 7(l)(d)), rape (article
7(l)(g)), persecution (articles 7(l)(h)), and other inhumane acts (article 7(l)(k)). Amidst controversial
statements from the AU leaders, the ICC Trial Chamber V(b) initially vacated the trial commencement
date on 19 September 2014, and then on 3 December 2014 rejected the Prosecution’s request for further
adjournment. Finally, on 5 December 2014, the Prosecution filed a notice to withdraw charges against
Kenyatta. Despite the tension that has arisen out of the trial of the Kenyan President Kenyatta who would
be the first sitting Head of State to face charges of crimes against humanity before the ICC were it not for
its withdrawal decision, the judicial decisions regarding the situation in Kenya as well as other situations
contribute to the development of case law in international criminal law.
2 Decision on the Confirmation of Charges Pursuant to Article 61(7) (a) and (b) of the Rome Statute, 23
January 2012, International Criminal Court, ICC-01/09-02/11 [hereinafter Decision 23 January 2012].
3 Decision 23 January 2012, para. 265.
4 Decision 23 January 2012, para. 266.
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These forms of humiliation and violence take on powerful political and
symbolic meanings.5
In this respect, it is hard to argue that the main problem regarding international
criminal prosecutions on sexual violence against men is ‘‘the exclusion of civilian
males as subjects of protection or as victims’’ (Carpenter 2006, 85). Rather, the key
problem concerns the understanding of when and how sexual violence against men
is subjected to prosecution. The decision of the ICC to dismiss sexual assault claims
against male victims who were subject to forced nudity, forcible circumcision, and
penile amputation evokes further questioning as to whether the Court’s approach
represents a deviation from the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR),
the International Criminal Tribunal former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the Special
Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) with regards to the prosecution of sexual violence
crimes.
Rather than isolating rape and other forms of sexual assault from elements of
ethnic prejudice or any other representations of inter-group conflicts, the ICTY,
ICTR, and SCSL interpret such crimes in connection with, inter alia, the ethnic
motivations of the defendants. The ICC’s interpretation in the Kenya situation might
be either due to its taking ethnic motivations and superiority claims as disconnected
from sexual violence, or its search for an additional element other than targeting the
victim’s sexual organs or sexual integrity with ethnic prejudices. These differences
notwithstanding, the common denominator in the approaches of various criminal
systems to rape and sexual assault is the ultimate aim of preventing and punishing
violations against sexual autonomy.6 The ICC’s approach triggers the question of
why it concluded that there had not been a violation against the sexual autonomy of
males in this case, and how forced nudity, penile amputation and forced
circumcision are interpreted as acts not of a sexual nature.
In order to resolve this puzzle, the first section commences with a summary of the
incorporation of norms prohibiting and sanctioning sexual violence in international
humanitarian law and international criminal law before elaborating more exten-
sively on sexual assault trials and intersectionality. The main objective of this
section is to show that the ICC does not substantially differ from the preceding case
law in failing to develop a critical perspective towards gendered categories or
stereotypes with a simultaneous acknowledgment and (re)construction of masculine
narratives of sexual violence. The second section scrutinizes the ICC’s Kenya
Decision, and particularly explores the interplay between sexuality and ethnicity
while underlining that different roles are ascribed to male and female members of
the ‘‘enemy’’ group. The third section begins to articulate what might be the
meaning of the (in)visibility of sexual harm with respect to male power and
5 Women, Peace and Security: Study submitted by the Secretary-General pursuant to Security Council
resolution 1325 (2000), para. 59, available at http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/public/eWPS.pdf. See
also UN Security Council Resolution No. 1325 (S/RES/1325) (31 October 2000), and UN Security
Council Resolution, Women and Peace and Security, (U.N. Doc. S/RES/1820) (19 June 2008).
6 Prosecutor v. Kunarac et al., 22 February 2001, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia, IT-96-23-T & IT-96-23/1-T, para. 457 [hereinafter Prosecutor v. Kunarac et al.].
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dominance, and continues by exploring its distinct impact on societies that are
experiencing a transitional justice process.
The primary aim of this article is to demonstrate that the ICC, by attributing a
particular understanding of sexual nature disengaged from ethnic superiority claims,
confirms the patriarchal discourse that denies much of women’s sexual and political
agency. The Kenya decision shows that ethnic superiority claims and sexual
violence are not mutually exclusive, but that the particular way the sexual nature
element is interpreted determines whether sexual violence has been committed or
not. In this interpretation, the loss or mutilation of sexual organs are taken as a
deprivation of manhood which precipitates the loss of power in sexual intercourse,
yet this loss is not accepted as constituting sexual assault until the performative or
sexual intercourse stage. Thus, sexual assault is not deemed to have taken place
when there is no performance in this sense, albeit the mutilation of sexual organs
represents actual or symbolic deprivation of male power.
Instrumentalizing the male sexual organ as such, the ICC introduces a legal
discourse regarding sexual violence acts that is very much the same as earlier
international criminal tribunals, notwithstanding the initial impression that both the
Rome Statute and recent case law represent significant improvement in comparison
with its predecessors. Due to this reason, a further aim of this article is to undermine
potential relief after the Rome Statute on account of the putative progressiveness of
the ICC. The ICC case law, rather than contradicting the case law of the ad hoc
tribunals and courts, corresponds with precedent law, which continuously (re)con-
structs and (re)produces acts of sexual violence as a game played mainly by men
where women hold the role of passive recipients of male dominance.
It is not the lack of consideration of harm and violence against women in legal
spheres, but rather the way such harm and violence are understood and interpreted
that present a real problem from a feminist legal theory perspective, as ‘‘the
conceptual and practical outworkings of such consideration affirm [women’s]
secondary and disjunctive social status’’ (Ni Aolain 2009, 221). The ICC, by
ignoring the sexual and gendered harm to male victims in the Kenya case, delineates
women as the only victims in a covert manner and thus reinforces a masculine
manifestation of sexual violence. In this manner, women are once again victimized
and subordinated in a legal system with patriarchal components.
The conceptualization of male sexual violence in international criminal law is
intertwined with the conceptualization of female sexual violence, both of which
seem to this author to be to the detriment of multiple voices. Thus, this article is not
an attempt to propose that male sexual violence should be conceptualized in similar
ways as female sexual violence. Instead, this article encourages legal scholars, law-
makers, and activists to reinitiate a critical engagement with the implications of the
way sexual violence is framed and interpreted by law and how such implications
have profound resonance for women even when the direct victims of the acts are
men. The ICC interpretation in the Kenya case should be scrutinized and actively
confronted in order to prevent international criminal law on sexual violence from
evolving towards a hazardous point where the masculinity of violence is perpetuated
in the theatre of the courtroom as well as the theatre of war. While welcoming the
endeavour of international criminal tribunals and courts to prosecute sexual violence
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crimes, this article contends that feminist criminal law scholarship should take a
critical position in the discursive fray not only during conflicts, but also transitional
justice processes including but not limited to prosecutions on sexual violence crimes
(Ni Aolain 2012). The conclusion posits the view that keeping a vigilant feminist
outlook towards international prosecutions has the real potential to reverse the
harmful (re)construction and (re)production process of patriarchal gender relations
in court rooms. Accordingly, the ICC’s Kenya narrative must be resisted in order to
prevent the closure of discourse on sexual violence crimes so that ‘‘its hold on the
interpretation of reality can be broken’’ (Davies 1994, 370).
Sexual Violence in International Criminal Law
The internationalization of sexual violence crimes as a recent development has been
subject to two almost concurrent transmissions: one from the honour discourse7 to
the criminal law discourse, and the other from the side-effect discourse to the
weapon discourse.8 The honour discourse has to a certain extent been overcome
through the jurisprudence of the ICTR, ICTY, SCSL, and finally the ICC with the
codification and prosecution of sexual and gender violence under the categories of
war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide. Both of these transitions are
generally interpreted positively (Askin 2003; Bedont and Hall-Martinez 1999; Boon
2001; Hagay-Frey 2011). However feminist scholarship warns against the danger of
depicting women as subdued, passive, and powerless individuals lacking political
agency both during (Aradau 2008; Baaz and Stern 2013; Penttinen 2007) and in the
aftermath of conflict when sexual violence crimes become subject to prosecutions
(Copelon 2000).
Notwithstanding the successes in terms of ending impunity, international
prosecutions’ precarious tendency to attribute victimhood to women and reinforce
stereotypes of women’s vulnerability and need for protection generates a difficult
dilemma. The problem is that feminist jurisprudence needs to resolve whether the
legal process should acknowledge the social and cultural perspectives and practices,
or reflect the actuality of practices that might end up with a failure to account for the
specific and lived experiences of the victim (Ni Aolain 2000, 61–62). In other
words, should the complex and specific experiences of the victims of sexual
violence be dismissed for an ideal type unencumbered by social context which
relates also to an aim of creating totalizing theories of harm?
7 Article 46 of the 1907 Hague Convention (IV), Article 27 of the Fourth Geneva Convention (1949), and
Article 76(1) of Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1977 (Protocol I) are the primary
international law instruments connecting the attack to the ‘‘honour’’ of the victims of rape and sexual
assault.
8 While the side-effect discourse regards rape and other forms of sexual violence as a permanent and
inevitable part of warfare, therefore unpunishable (Balthazar 2006, 44), the growing tendency with
regards to sex crimes when committed during international or internal armed conflicts is to conceive of
them as a strategic weapon designed to defeat and even to annihilate the enemy (Leatherman 2011;
Rittner and Roth 2012; Stiglmayer 1994).
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If justice is the recognition of harm (Franke 2006, 820), international criminal courts
and tribunals should underline the fact that there is more than one definition of harm,
and that there is a wide spectrum of harms experienced by a great number of people.
Taking into consideration the relationality of harms as products of a social context that
includes gender, ethnicity, and/or religion, as well as rejecting the conflation of gender
with sexual violence (Grewal 2015, 161–163) ‘‘enables analysis of the masculinity of
conflicts’’ (Ni Aolain and Rooney 2007, 340). Within this framework, it becomes
equally significant to unfold not only how far international criminal law hasmoved in its
treatment of the intersecting identities in sexual violence crimes, but also what might be
lost as a result of developing a single narrative on violence.
Sexual Assault Trials and Intersectionality
Central to intersectionality theory is the purpose of transcending the monocular
vision to have access to the impact of social forces and dynamics (MacKinnon 2013,
1020), and addressing ‘‘the combined effects of practices which discriminate on the
basis of race, and on the basis of sex’’ (Crenshaw 1989, 149). Yet, intersectionality
would fail to effectuate the underlying intention of undermining the hierarchies of
power if the term is conceived of merely with reference to a field of study of the
object or an analytical strategy while ruling out its critical dimension (Collins 2015).
Articulation of intersectionality as ‘‘critical praxis’’ is meant to ‘‘seek knowledge
projects [which] would critique social injustices that characterize complex social
inequalities, imagine alternatives, and/or propose viable action strategies for
change’’ (Collins 2015, 17). Nevertheless, international prosecutions on sexual
violence have proved to be falling short of presenting such a critical stance so far.
For MacKinnon (2013, 1023), the failure during international prosecutions to open
up a critical interrogation of the connection between race, gender and other
categories is due to the tendency to take these categories as the reason or dynamic
creating the inequality rather than the outcomes.
Despite the fact that ‘‘violence against women, and gender inequality, is made
visible and treated seriously’’ during the prosecutions, what we have is a partial
visibility (Buss 2007, 13). Indeed, the over-determination of ethnicity, which Buss
(2008) considers to be a major constraint in comprehending the complexity of
sexual violence, has been the common feature of international prosecutions, and
identifying the ethnic character of the conflict between parties played a facilitative
role for the prosecutors to prove the coercive circumstances under which sexual
assaults occured. It is widely acknowledged that rape was used as a war instrument
during the Yugoslavian and Rwandan conflicts in order to ‘‘punish the victims and/
or to intimidate them or their communities.’’9 Rapes and sexual assaults had an
ethnic character, rather than serving to improve soldiers’ fighting spirit or providing
them with sexual comfort.10 The discourse accompanying rapes also implied an
9 Prosecutor v. Celebici, 16 November 1998, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia,
IT-96-21-T, para. 448 [hereinafter Prosecutor v. Celebici]. See also Prosecutor v. Kunarac et al., para.
311.
10 Prosecutor v. Kunarac et al., paras. 43, 583, 592.
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ultimate goal of affecting the biological characteristics of the targeted group as an
intrinsic component.11 Likewise, the ICTR underlined that ‘‘[s]exual violence was a
step in the process of destruction of the Tutsi group—destruction of the spirit, of the
will to live, and of life itself.’’12 The destruction plan intrinsically implied
antagonism against another ethnic group as expressed through derogatory discourses
such as those seen in the case of Musema, who declared that ‘‘[t]he pride of the
Tutsis will end today’’ during the rape of a victim.13
In none of these decisions was there a critical interrogation of whether ethnicity
or patriarchy was produced through rather than just leading to the atrocities (Buss
2008, 115). ‘‘Patriarchy becomes an analytical shortcut for assessing the constitu-
tion of community’’ when a substantial part of the Bosnian Muslim male population
in Srebrenica was destroyed (Buss 2007, 21). Likewise, the SSCL is heralded for its
conceptualization of the crime of forced marriage, and establishment of the
intertwined relationship between sexual slavery and forced marriage14 despite ‘‘the
naturalisation and legitimation of (patriarchal) family and marriage structures when
contrasted with the aberrant practice of forced marriage in war’’ (Grewal 2015,
153).
Apparently, an intersectionality method with no critical dimension is prone to
(re)produce the categories or stereotypes reflecting hierarchical power relations,
while the transformative power [of law] is lost (MacKinnon 2013, 1023, 1024).
Failing to consider that social realities are not ‘‘static abstract classifications’’ but
rather in constant flux representing ‘‘moving substantive realities’’ (MacKinnon
2013, 1023), sexual assault trials have the unintended danger of introducing yet
another totalizing narrative. International criminal law and courts ‘‘create a
symbolic space within which competing narratives of crimes, perpetrators and
victims are produced, circulated and contested, and intimately related to the
narratives of justice, responsibility and guilt’’ (Zarkov and Glasius 2014, v).
Emphasizing one amongst a myriad of competing and contrasting narratives implies
that international criminal law introduces its own ‘‘truth’’ dependent on a single
ontology. The trials, in narrating a single truth, not only determine what took place
during the conflicts, but also suppress alternative and subordinated voices by
victimizing a whole gender group. Thus, this single ontology of the past and present
constructs a parallel future by not hearing the dissident voices of men and women
11 Prosecutor v. Celebici, para. 928; Prosecutor v. Kunarac et al., paras. 322, 342; Prosecutor v. Lukic &
Lukic, 20 July 2009, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, IT-98-32/1-T, para. 695;
Prosecutor v. Brdanin, 1 September 2004, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, IT-
99-36-T, para. 1011 [hereinafter Prosecutor v. Brdanin].
12 Prosecutor v. Jean Paul Akayesu, 2 September 1998, International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda,
ICTR–96-4-T, para. 732 [hereinafter Prosecutor v. Akayesu].
13 Prosecutor v. Musema, 27 January 2000, International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, ICTR-96-13-A,
para. 933.
14 Prosecutor v. Issa Hassan Sesay, Morris Kallon and Augustine Gbao, 2 March 2009, Special Court for
Sierra Leone, SCSL-04-15-T, paras. 1291–1297, 1459–1473, 1581–1582. The SCSL takes an even further
step by replacing the term ‘‘forced marriage’’ with ‘‘conjugal slavery’’ in the Taylor case (Prosecutor v.
Taylor, 18 May 2012, Special Court for Sierra Leone, SCSL-03-01-T, paras. 428–30.) The SSCL, on the
other hand, is criticised for silencing women by excluding evidence of sexual violence during the Civil
Defence Forces (CDF) case. See Kelsall and Stepakoff (2007), and Oosterveld (2009).
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who have been fighting against patriarchal discourses both before and in the
aftermath of the conflicts. A serious complication of a discourse on sexual violence
crimes (re)presenting limited and reductive accounts of identities (Buss 2007, 19)
seems to be that its use now extends to the prosecutions before the ICC.
The ICC’s Intersectionality Approach
The ICC, though still in its infancy in terms of its jurisprudence with regards to
sexual violence crimes, seems to follow a very similar pattern to its predecessors,
both in terms of the written rules and at the prosecutorial stage. Article 7 (1) (g) of
the Rome Statute considers ‘‘rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced
pregnancy, enforced sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence of
comparable gravity’’ to be acts constituting crimes against humanity.15 Besides
providing flexible grounds for sexual violence crimes, Article 7 (1) (g) is sex-neutral
in how it defines sexual violence. The Elements of Crimes of the Rome Statute
provides further clarifications on what falls within the meaning of Article 7 (1)
(g) constituting crimes against humanity of sexual violence:
The perpetrator committed an act of a sexual nature against one or more
persons or caused such person or persons to engage in an act of a sexual nature
by force, or by threat of force or coercion, such as that caused by fear of
violence, duress, detention, psychological oppression or abuse of power,
against such person or persons or another person, or by taking advantage of a
coercive environment or such person’s or persons’ incapacity to give genuine
consent.16
Though it is not explicitly explained in the Rome Statute and Elements of the
Crimes what is implied by the notion of ‘‘sexual nature’’, the ICC, while discussing
the elements of the crime against humanity of sexual slavery, hints at the meaning of
sexual nature as ‘‘matters relating to […] sexual activity.’’17 This recent definition
reflects a more comprehensive understanding of sexual violence in comparison with
the former approach on male victims, which used to be confined to anal rape (Van
Tienhoven 1993, 133). Limiting sexual violence against men to anal rape has been
both a reason for and outcome of under-reporting and ignoring male sexual
violence, as other forms of sexual violence do not always produce physically
observable consequences even when the assault is directed to the genitals (Carlson
2006, 21).
In more cases than not, the ICC acknowledges the intersection of sexual violence
with ethnicity. For instance, authorizing the Prosecutor to conduct an investigation
15 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 17 July 1998, UN Doc. A/CONF. 183/9, 2187
U.N.T.S. 3.
16 Elements of Crimes of the International Criminal Court, ICC-ASP/1/3 at 108, U.N. Doc. PCNICC/
2000/1/Add.2 (2000).
17 Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, Situation in the Democratic Republic the Congo in the Case
of Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, 30 September 2008, International
Criminal Court, ICC-01/04-01/07, para. 432 [hereinafter Decision 30 September 2008].
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into the situation in Kenya, the ICC argues that such acts of violence have an ethnic
dimension and target specific ethnic groups:
While the supporting material corroborates that some of the rapes and sexual
violence may be qualified as opportunistic acts facilitated by the general
climate of civil unrest and lawlessness, there are however instances of sexual
violence encompassing an ethnic dimension and targeting specific ethnic
groups.18
In the situation of Cote d’Ivoire, the ICC conforms to the prevalent perspective that
the targeted civilian victims should be perceived by the perpetrator(s) as belonging
to a different type of group, which is most commonly an ethnic group. Pre-Trial
Chamber III, in its Cote d’Ivoire decision, states ‘‘the available information
substantiates the Prosecutor’s submission’’19 that victims of rape belonged to a
different group and were targeted because of their ethnicity and political affiliation:
[D]uring the period of post-election violence, pro-Gbagbo forces were
responsible for acts of rape against individuals who were active and public
members of Alassane Ouattara’s political party or who, on account of their
ethnicity, were considered to be pro-Ouattara (e.g. those who spoke Dioula or
Mossi, or who came from Mali).20
In a more recent decision on the ‘‘Situation in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo,’’ the Pre-Trial Chamber II concludes that the Union des Patriotes Congolais/
Forces Patriotiques pour la Libération du Congo (UPC/FPLC) adopted an
organizational policy including rape (counts 4 and 5) and sexual slavery (counts
7 and 8) to attack part of the civilian population belonging to ethnic groups other
than the Hema (the ‘‘non-Hema’’).21
Nevertheless, the Court does not demonstrate a straightforward and consistent
stance with regards to intersectionality, including but not limited to sexual violence
crimes. Despite Bemba being the first person to be apprehended on an ICC arrest
warrant for charges of rape,22 the Pre-Trial Chamber declined to confirm the charges
of torture and outrages upon personal dignity and decided to subsume the latter two
under the charge of rape.23 Green (2011) argues that, by denying cumulative
18 Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorization of an Investigation into the
Situation in the Republic of Kenya, 31 March 2010, International Criminal Court, ICC-01/09-19, para.
155 [hereinafter Decision 31 March 2010].
19 Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorization of an Investigation into the
Situation in the Republic of Cote d’Ivoire, 3 October 2011, International Criminal Court, ICC-02/11-14,
para. 72 [hereinafter Decision 3 October 2011].
20 Decision 3 October 2011, para. 69.
21 Decision Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute on the Charges of the Prosecutor
Against Bosco Ntaganda, 9 June 2014, International Criminal Court, ICC-01/04-02/06, para. 36.
22 Decision on the Prosecutor’s Application for a Warrant of Arrest against Jean Pierre Bemba Gombo
(Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo), 10 June 2008, International Criminal Court, ICC-01/05-01/08,
para. 1 [hereinafter Bemba Warrant Decision].
23 Decision Pursuant to Article 61(7)(1) and (b) of the Rome Statute on the Charges against jean-Pierre
Bemba Gombo (Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo),15 June 2009, International Criminal Court,
ICC/01/05-01/08-424, paras. 204, 310 [Bemba Charging Decision].
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charges and conflating the crimes of rape, torture, and outrages upon personal
dignity, the ICC fails to adequately recognize the spectrum of harms inflicted by
sexual and gender-based crimes. Despite the fact that ‘‘sexual violence seemed to be
a central feature of the conflict’’24 in the Central African Republic (CAR), the
failure to lay cumulative charges in the Bemba case has undermined the attempt to
grasp the intersectionality of sexual and gender violence, which is a failure
accompanied by a ‘‘lack of understanding of [such] violence at the policy level.’’25
Though it is noteworthy that the Court included the rape of men,26 its inability to see
that both sexual and gendered harms are produced through the intersection of
ethnicity, sex, gender, and religion in the Bemba case becomes even more
problematic in the Kenyatta case. Here, the discourse of the ICC intersects with the
formation and reformation of collective discourses on sexual violence crimes which
reflect a masculinist perspective.
The ICC and the Kenya Case
In connection with the eruption of post-election violence in Kenya which took place
between 1 June 2005 and 26 November 2009, the ICC alleges that crimes falling
under its jurisdiction have been committed between rival groups as well as by the
government forces with an effort to suppress the conflict.27 The first wave of
violence was initiated by groups associated with the Orange Democratic Movement
(ODM) directed against supporters of the Party of National Unity (PNU). The
members of the targeted groups then organized retaliatory attacks against those
deemed responsible for the initial attacks. While the attackers targeted their victims
on the grounds of membership in the ODM or the PNU, the acts of violence also had
an ethnic character mainly due to the putative convergence of political affiliation
with ethnicity.
The post-election violence in Kenya was overwhelmingly characterized by ethnic
disputes where the boundaries between ethnic groups overlap with political
affiliations. The victims of the first wave of violence were mainly from the non-
Kalenjin community and in particular people of Kikuyu, Kisii and Luhya ethnicity,
who were perceived as being affiliated with the PNU. In return, counter attacks were
directed mainly against non-Kikuyu communities, including in particular people of
Kalenjin, Luo, and Luhya ethnicity, who were considered by the Mungiki attackers
to be affiliated with the ODM. Despite the overlap between ethnic rivalries and
political affiliations, the ICC emphasizes the ethnic dimension rather than the
political divisions. Statements about ‘‘a Luo victim from Nakuru who was gang
24 Making a Statement: A Review of Charges and Prosecutions for Gender-based Crimes before the
International Criminal Court, 25 February 2010, 2d ed., Women’s Initiatives for Gender Justice, p. 30,
http://iccwomen.org/publications/articles/docs/MaS2_10-10_web.pdf, [hereinafter Making a Statement].
25 Making a Statement, p. 30. On the other hand, writers such as Bedont and Hall-Martinez (1999, 70);
Buss (2007); Charlesworth (1999, 387), and Hagay-Frey (2011) have criticized the ICC for its association
of sexual violence with the ethnic dimensions of the conflicts.
26 Bemba Charging Decision, para. 159.
27 Decision 31 March 2010.
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raped in January 2008 [whose assailants] were of Kikuyu ethnicity’’28 or a woman
‘‘having been raped in Naivasha by five men who spoke Kikuyu’’29 support the
argument that the conflict takes place between the Kikuyu, organized under the
Mungiki organization, and non-Kikuyu groups, who are mainly of Luo and Kalenjin
origins. Forced nudity and forced circumcision occurred when ‘‘the Mungiki
attackers forced [Luo men in Naivasha] to remove their underwear to confirm their
ethnicity and forcibly circumcised [them] if they were identified as Luo.’’30 Yet,
after referring to the Prosecutor’s statement that ‘‘these weren’t just attacks on
men’s sexual organs as such but were intended as attacks on men’s identities as men
within their society and were designed to destroy their masculinity,’’31 the Court
concludes that:
[N]ot every act of violence which targets parts of the body commonly
associated with sexuality should be considered an act of sexual violence.
[…][T]he evidence placed before it does not establish the sexual nature of the
acts of forcible circumcision and penile amputation visited upon Luo men.
Instead, it appears from the evidence that the acts were motivated by ethnic
prejudice and intended to demonstrate cultural superiority of one tribe over the
other.32
In brief, the rationale of the ICC’s decision to not consider forced circumcision and
penile mutilation as sexual violence is due to, first, the lack of the sexual nature
element, and second, the main motive being ethnic prejudice and superiority claims.
With this interpretation, Pre-Trial Chamber II seems to deviate not only from its
previous Decision of 31 March 2010, but also from the general approach in
international criminal law that links sexual stereotypes to ethnic identities. The
intriguing part of the ICC decision is not merely that forced nudity, forcible
circumcision, and penile amputation are not taken as humiliating and degrading in a
sexual manner, or that sexuality is detached from ethnicity. The ICC interprets the
interplay between sexuality and ethnicity in different ways with regards to male and
female members of the group while making certain acts directed at male sexuality
invisible. As the ‘‘invisibility of sexual assault against men is related to the role of
the male body in the production of ethnicity, and with notions of masculinity and
norms of heterosexuality therein’’ (Zarkov 2007, 156), the ICC, rather than overtly
contradicting with the previous ad hoc tribunals discourse, reflects a covert
patriarchal discourse which regards acts of mutilation of male sexual organs as
damaging the male power.
Raping or otherwise sexually abusing female members of an ethnic group is
regarded as sexual violence for both the female victims and male members of the
group, because it is their women being subject to sexual violence. Sexual violence
against women represents acts of mutilation of the dominance of the male members
28 Decision 23 January 2012, para. 258.
29 Decision 23 January 2012, para. 259.
30 Decision 23 January 2012, paras. 260–261.
31 Decision 23 January 2012, para. 264.
32 Decision 23 January 2012, paras. 265–266.
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of that group as they fail to protect and stop violence against their women. On the
other hand, males’ act of mutilating other males through depriving the latter of
power by penile amputation is a representation of a different type of mutilation of
male dominance. Penile amputation and mutilation correspond to the deprivation of
male power within a community in the same manner as dispossessing weapons or
any other means of power practices. While it is a matter of consent for female
victims, sexual violence against men becomes an issue of possessing or
dispossessing the means of power to control and dominate such consent. In this
context, the ICC not only interprets the mutilation of male sexual organs as yet
another ‘‘way of communication between male combatants’’ (Ni Aolain 2009, 224),
but also perpetuates a particular political context that makes some victims visible
while others are invisible. As noted by Zarkov (2007, 163) ‘‘the Other of
masculinity is not only the feminine and homosexual Other, but also the racialized,
colonized, ethicized Other; and […] it is the body of the male Other that becomes
the site of violence.’’
The Kenyatta Case: A Deviation or Rather a Continuation
in International Criminal Law?
Sexual assault is defined as comprising ‘‘all serious abuses of a sexual nature inflicted
upon the integrity of a person by means of coercion, threat of force or intimidation in
a way that is humiliating and degrading to the victim’s dignity.’’33 However, this
definition does not reveal the patriarchal discourse (re)produced by international
prosecutions, which implies that the violence done to male and female victims carry
different meanings. Sex is taken as something that ‘‘normally […] men do to
women’’ (MacKinnon 1983, 650) which, taken as such, becomes abnormal when a
woman’s consent to a man to perform his dominance becomes dubious and when a
man loses his dominant role in any sexual intercourse. It becomes a consent issue for
female victims, but a dominance problem when the victims are male.
Thus, forcing Mehmedalija Sarajlic, an elderly Bosnian Muslim, to rape another
Bosnian Muslim female detainee in Omarska camp was considered sexual assault
regardless of whether or not the rape took place.34 What Mehmedalija Sarajlic lost
in this incident was not his consent, but his male power to ‘‘decide’’ on his own to
perform sex. Intentionally forcing, at gunpoint, two Muslim brothers detained at
33 Prosecutor v. Furundzija, 10 December 1998, IT-95-17/1-T, para. 186 [hereinafter Prosecutor v.
Furundzija]; Prosecutor v. Stakic, 31 July 2003, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia, IT-97-24-T, para. 757.
34 Prosecutor v. Brdanin, paras. 516, 1013. The Furundzija Trial Chamber finds that being forced to
watch serious sexual attacks inflicted on a female acquaintance is torture for the forced observer
(Prosecutor v. Furundzija, para. 267). The Brdanin Trial Chamber confirms this approach when it states
that threatening the male members of these groups that ‘‘their mothers and sisters would be raped in front
of them’’ is part of the ill-treatment, which signifies the constant humiliation and degradation as an
element of torture (Prosecutor v. Brdanin, para. 1018). In Prosecutor v. Kvocka et al., the Trial Chamber
stresses, inter alia, that ‘‘[t]he presence of onlookers, particularly family members, also inflicts severe
mental harm amounting to torture on the person being raped’’ (Prosecutor v. Kvocka et al., 2 November
2001, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, IT-98-30/1-T, para. 149).
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Luka Camp to perform fellatio on each other in the presence of others,35 forcing two
male detainees to perform fellatio on each other in the police station in Bosanski
Samac,36 and forcing male detainees to engage in degrading sexual acts with each
other in the presence of other detainees in Batković,37 and in Omarska camps38 are
interpreted as sexual assault in a very similar way to cases when men were ‘‘obliged
to ‘make love’ with a hole’’ (Dolan 2010, 20) or with numerous women (including
mothers and sisters) in the Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). While
women are deemed to lose their consent when they are raped or sexually assaulted,
they are attributed passive roles unlike the male victims of sexual violence who lose
their active agency through feminization, homosexualization or emasculation
(Sivakumaran 2007, 268–273).
Forcing detainees to perform sex acts with each other does not produce the same
meaning for males or females. International criminal law speaks of sexual assault
for male victims when they are coerced, threatened, forced or intimidated into
performing sex on another in the absence not of their consent but of their
dominance. International tribunals accept cases of sexual violence against men
when men are disempowered vis-a-vis their sex-partner, which means that men are
feminized as they are put into a passive position where their male decision-making
capacity to initiate and perform sex is taken away from them.
The ethnic identity of the sexual violence victims, instead of causing
complications, provides a supporting element, though ethnicity in the Kenya case
is interpreted as a nullifying element rather than a supporting one. This approach
supports the lack of female agency when it comes to rape and sexual violence
crimes and confirms the view that female members of an ethnic group are the
property of the group, while male members are the real and active representatives of
the group identity. Penile amputation is the removal of a sexual organ that
represents man’s capacity to perform dominance in society. The Kenya decision
confirms that penile amputation is violence done to manhood. But, rather than a
form of sexual violence, it is taken as a power game over the means associated with
manhood. In this respect, because the elements of forced sexual performance are
absent, penile amputation or mutilation is understood as deprivation of the means to
perform dominance in a male-dominant world. Thus, penile amputation is another
example of taking the weapons of the so-called real fighters of the enemy.
Reflecting on the inevitable consequence of the constitution of sexuality as an
object that enables both self-ownership of the sexual identity and its seizure or
commodification by third parties, Davies (1994, 376, 382; 1999, 338–341) cogently
articulates that the sexual relationship is no exception to possessive and proprietary
relationships where self-construction is maintained through exclusion, repression,
35 Prosecutor v. Cesic, 11 March 2004, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, IT-
95-10/1-S, paras. 13, 14, 35.
36 Prosecutor v. Todorovic, 31 July 2001, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, IT-
95-9/1-S, paras. 39–40.
37 Prosecutor v. Krajisnik, 27 September 2006, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia, IT-00-39-T, para. 800.
38 Prosecutor v. Tadic, 7 May 1997, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, IT-94-1-
T, para. 206.
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and formulation of identity. When the sexual relationship is interpreted with notions
of possession, there seems to be no significant difference between love and rape,
where femininity is attributed to being appropriated, and masculinity corresponds to
appropriation in both cases (Davies 1994, 372). Again, it is not the quality but the
degree of the relationship that is in change with regard to male sexual violence when
the perpetrator seizes the proprietor, or the otherwise possessive role of the male
victims. The property, here, is signified through a masculine organ, the mutilation of
which symbolizes the loss of manhood. Thus, the ICC’s Kenya interpretation
confirms the perpetuation of the phallic economy where all types of exchange take
place between men (Irigaray 1985). The Court translates the Kenyan violence as a
conflictual exchange between male combatants where the male sexual organ is one
of the targeted and destroyed properties.
On account of the positive developments with regards to the ICC’s initiative of
achieving gender justice both at the administrative level as well as the prosecutions,
what is overlooked is the fact that individual freedom and genuine equality are
compromised and even frustrated by the Court’s unintended complicity in the
patriarchal discourse which is under continuous construction. When the security of
individuals and groups is defined by security professionals and politicians in ethnic
terms, as happened in former Yugoslavia and in Rwanda, different ethnic groups are
perceived as threatening identities that pose a security dilemma for the society to be
protected. The crux of the matter here is that these ethnic identities are taken as if
they are fixed and monolithic structures whereas both the threatening other as well
as the threatened us identities are mutually constructed and reified in a political
process (Bilgic 2014, 265–266). Rather than providing ‘‘an official version of the
past’’ (Wilson 2011) or ‘‘background information’’, international criminal courts
and tribunals possess a tendency to transform grand narratives into clear-cut
forensic evidence (Dojcinovic 2014). With regard to sexual violence crimes, this
tendency shows itself in providing a subjective account of ‘‘what happened’’
through a patriarchal perspective as if the latter constitutes the only truth and reality.
One of the most important outcomes of the perpetuation of the masculine
discourse in court rooms is the contribution to the reconstruction of inter-group
conflict that has been founded not only on ethnic lines, but along with a rigid
patriarchal understanding, albeit in a different domain, using a different—i.e. legal—
discourse. For instance, Buss (2014, 77), looking closely at the practice of the ICTY
in the Srebrenica case, argues that ‘‘[k]nowledge is not simply encountered in
international criminal law: it is also produced.’’ Other than this single ontological and
epistemological approach, we cannot hear the voices of individual women or
feminist groups such as Women in Black (WiB), who have been fighting against
patriarchal discourses and practices before, during, and in the aftermath of the
Srebrenica massacre (see Bilgic 2014). What we can hear and understand is a
totalized ‘‘truth’’ for Srebrenica women, who are depicted collectively as members of
a highly patriarchal community for whom survival, and successfully re-establishing
their lives without men, became almost impossible.39




Now, through the early examples of case law, the ICC seems to follow the same
path trodden by the ad hoc tribunals by confirming the ongoing process of rival
identity constructions between and within communities. Reinforcement of ethnic
differences, and minimizing women’s sexual and political agency through
international prosecutions might be interpreted as ‘‘unintended consequences’’
(Engle 2005, 807) though such consequences unfortunately lead to the confinement
of both male and female identities within closed, non-inclusive, and inflexible
communities.
The judiciary dimension of transitional justice has the dangerous potential to
contribute to the re-masculinization process of post-conflict societies (Cockburn and
Zarkov 2002; Franke 2006, 824; Ni Aolain 2006, 830; 2009). As it stands, the
international community’s role in transitioning societies represents in its current
form a perilous approach in its endorsement and even reproduction of, rather than
confrontation against, traditional gendered discourses. In addition to the ‘‘intra-
male’’ feature of negotiations in transitional justice processes (Ni Aolain and
Rooney 2007), international prosecutions on sexual violence follow the pattern of
inequality through acknowledging and (re)producing the intra-male character of the
conflict. What is at stake is the contribution of the international community with its
own patriarchal discourse that perpetuates inequalities and handicaps engrained in
groups with different identities that establish the real causes of the conflict.
The ICC neither opposes nor criticizes the local patriarchal discourse, but
replaces it with the international community’s male-oriented discourse (Handrahan
2004) by depicting the conflict as intra-male and extracting the sexual trait of the
violence imposed on men in Kenya. Thus, it is not only an incomplete narrative with
regard to what had happened. The Court makes a choice amongst various narratives,
erases the ‘‘sexual’’ and ‘‘gender’’ dimensions of acts of forcible circumcision and
penile amputation, and carries a patriarchal discourse which is essentially
oppressive for women into the post-conflict period. By doing so, the ICC does
not actually and effectively take part in a ‘‘transitioning’’ process as it remains
contestable what type of a transition is in process as long as transitional justice
projects produce restricted accounts of violence and remedy (Nagy 2008).
Although the ICC gives the impression that it deviates from its predecessors
when it disconnects sexual violence from ethnic prejudices and motivations in the
situation of Kenya, there is apparently a pattern followed to the detriment of genuine
gender equality. The ICC, in its particular interpretation of male sexual violence in
the Kenya Decision of 23 January 2012, reinforces a masculine manifestation of
sexual violence, excludes gendered violence directed towards males, and thus
victimizes and subordinates women once more by confirming the intra-male
character of the conflict. Humiliation and degradation are certainly an element in
sexual violence crimes, yet the meaning attributed to humiliation differs according
to the victim’s gender. Men are humiliated when they are deprived of their male
power to perform sexual intercourse either through penile amputation or being
forced to perform sex acts without their consent to act. The type of consent is a
different one for women, as women are still regarded as the passive actors who give
consent to men, who are acknowledged as the active performers. The male victim is
deprived of his active agency by losing his control of the male sexual organ to
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which patriarchal societies commonly attribute manhood, or when he is forced to
watch female members of his ethnic group being raped or sexually abused in other
ways than rape. Thereby, the ICC, following the ICTY’s contribution to ‘‘Balkan-
patriarchy’’ (Hansen 2000) and the ICTR’s similar approach of reconstructing
patriarchal discourse in Hutu and Tutsi communities (Buss 2009), takes part in the
reproduction of a world-wide patriarchy discourse.
The crucial problem in all violence cases, of which feminists should be vigilant,
is the mutilation of female agency not only at the pre-conflict stage or in the course
of the conflict, but also at the post-conflict stage where international criminal
prosecutions (re)construct the patriarchal discourse. Rather than broadening the
crime categories to cover all forms of sexual violence as well as introducing a novel
definition to include violence targeting an individual’s imputed, perceived, or actual
sexuality (Lewis 2009), the main concern should be to realize that international
prosecutions contribute to the transformation of imputed or perceived sexualities
into actual ones. Not hearing male and female voices with their personal
experiences, as well as not taking into account ‘‘gendered harms that men and
boys face’’ (Grewal 2015, 161), erase different realities for the sake of one reality
that speaks with a single and exclusionary male voice (Cornell 1993; Russell 2013).
However, ‘‘different contexts reveal different configurations of inequality’’
(McCall 2005, 1791). A meaningful remedy cannot be achieved unless the problem
is identified not as a fixed male identity, but as any ‘‘dominant framework of
discrimination’’ (Crenshaw 1989, 152). With a radical discursive contestation
against the congealment of gender-biased binaries, it will become clear that the
targeted group of victims does not necessarily have to be composed of only women
let alone a particular group of women for there to be subjugation and subordination.
Thus, following critiques of intersectionality theory’s tendency to homogenize
‘‘black womanhood’’ (Nash 2008; Walcott 2005), feminist scholarship must begin
to broaden its reach to hear different voices among all categories of women (Zack
2005, 7), and also go beyond womanhood to include intersectional identities like
‘‘straight white maleness’’ (Kwan 1996, 1275) or black maleness (Chang and Culp
Jr. 2002, 489). Just as ‘‘sexual offences must be treated as separate and independent
of the gender of the victim’’ (Grewal 2015, 161), gender violence must be treated as
separate and independent of the sex of the victim. In order to free itself from biased
violence narratives and contribute to their removal in favour of genuine justice
projects, law should develop a more critical stance against the dominant patriarchal
discourses sustained with a sufficiently flexible intersectionality perspective that
attends to the myriad of subjectivities that are implicated in ongoing inequalities and
injustices.
Conclusion: The ICC as a Congenitally Failing Operation
International prosecutions are not merely recounting the events of sexual violence;
they are also defining the essential parts of gender roles, which lead to a different
type of intervention in transitional societies through the translation of sufferings into
a particularly dominant patriarchal legal language. With international prosecutions,
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international criminal law enters into a dialogue with the patriarchal discourse. Yet,
this is a biased dialogue in favour of the dominant patriarchal discourse, which
almost always intersects with the ethnic character of the conflict albeit ruling out its
subjugated alternatives.
The prima facie outcome of the limited view of the wrong is that ‘‘any violence,
including sexual violence, that does not fit [the ethnic inter-group conflict]
framework […] slips out of focus’’ (Buss 2008, 115). A more covert though no less
detrimental outcome of this limited narrative is to support gender-biased categories
or stereotypes while burying subjective experiences of both men and women, and
eclipsing the multiple burdens they are subjected to. The image of the vulnerable
female victim, which is at the forefront of such stereotypes, both produces and is
produced by ‘‘the masculine bearer of ‘civilization’ who rescues ‘native’ women
from ‘barbarian’ men’’ (Otto 2006, 320). Confirmed and consolidated by the legal
system, the uttered binary of the masculine saviour and its feminine other furthers
the already gendered binary of the female victim and the male perpetrator. The
articulation of the crime and the criminal of sexual violence as such not only
signifies a certain type of atrocity, but also justifies ‘‘the rehabilitation of the post-
conflict state [that does] little, in effect, to address systemic violence and
inequality’’ (Buss 2011, 422). Law, instead, should take part in developing and
supporting transformative discourses by rendering visible feminist contestations
both at the local and global levels.
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